Justices:

Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Jamshed B Pardiwala, Justice Manoj Misra

Question(s): Whether the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 (“Madarsa Act“) is constitutional?

Factual Background:

The Madarsa Act established a ‘Board of Madarsa Education’ to regulate standards of education for students studying in Madarsas in the state. There are over 13,000 Madaras in Uttar Pradesh with over 12,00,000 students. These institutions provide both religious and secular education up to various levels including elementary, secondary, and higher education.

On 22 March 2024, a Division Bench (two-judges) of the Allahabad High Court invalidated the entire Madarsa Act. The High Court held that the Madarsa Act violated the principle of secularism and Articles 14 (equality), 21 (life and liberty) and 21-A (education) of the Constitution and contravened Section 22 (right to confer degrees) of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 (“UGC Act”).

It also directed the State Government to take steps to accommodate all students studying in Madrasas in schools recognised by the Education Boards of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Several Special Leave Petitions were filed against the judgment of the High Court. On 5 April 2024, the Supreme Court stayed the implementation of the judgment while it heard the case.

Decision of the Supreme Court:

A Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and upheld the constitutional validity of the Madarsa Act except the provisions which provided for the regulation of higher education degrees. These provisions were found to conflict with the UGC Act. The judgment of the Court was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud.

Reasons for the Decision:

Madarasa Act and secularism

The Supreme Court held that a statute cannot be invalidated for violating the principles that constitute the basic structure of the Constitution (such as secularism). A law can be struck down only for violating a specific provision of the Constitution or for being enacted by a legislature that was not empowered to enact the law in question. The Court ruled that concepts such as democracy, federalism, and secularism are undefined concepts and allowing courts to strike down legislation for violation of such concepts will lead to uncertainty.

The Supreme Court distinguished between “religious instruction” (teaching religious practices) and “religious education” (teaching the philosophy of religion). The Court found that Article 28 of the Constitution, which prevents imparting religious instruction at institutions maintained out of government funds, does not prohibit institutions from providing religious education nor does it prevent the government from recognising institutions imparting religious instruction alongside secular education.

The Supreme Court also held that the Madarsa Act furthers substantive equality for minority institutions. It held that secularism requires the State to take active steps to help minority institutions achieve high educational standards while allowing them to retain their minority character. The Court ruled that the Madarsa Act is consistent with the positive obligation of the State to ensure that students studying in recognised Madarsas attain a minimum level of competency which will allow them to effectively participate in society and earn a living.

Madarsa Act is a regulatory statute

The Supreme Court held that The legislative scheme of the Madarsa Act shows that it is not a law to provide religious instruction; rather it has been enacted to regulate the standard of education in Madarsas. The Court held that the State has an interest in ensuring that minority educational institutions provide standards of education similar to other educational institutions and it can enact regulatory measures to raise educational standards.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong in holding that education provided under the Madarsa Act is violative of Article 21A. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (“RTE Act”), which facilitates the fulfilment of the fundamental right under Article 21A, does not apply to minority educational institutions. The Court also observed that the state government has sufficient regulatory powers under the Madarsa Act to regulate standards of education in Madarsas.

State of Uttar Pradesh has the legislative competence to enact the Madarsa Act

The Supreme Court held that the state legislature of Uttar Pradesh was competent to enact The Madarsa Act under Entry 25, List III (“Education” under the Concurrent List). The Court held that just because the education which is sought to be regulated includes some religious teachings or instruction does not push the legislation outside the legislative competence of the state.

The Court held that Entry 25 of List III can not be interpreted to mean that only education that is devoid of any religious teaching or instruction is allowed to be regulated else it would fall outside the legislative competence of the state. The Court ruled that this interpretation would be against the constitutional scheme given that Article 30 expressly recognises the right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.

Some provisions of the Madarsa Act conflict with the UGC Act

The Supreme Court held that the UGC Act has been enacted by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I (‘standards for higher education’ in the Union List). The Court observed that it had held in several cases that the UGC Act occupies the field concerning the coordination and determination of standards in higher education. Further, Entry 25 of List III is expressly subject to, and thus subordinate to, Entry 66 of List I. Therefore, the Madarsa Act, to the extent that it seeks to regulate higher education, is in conflict with the UGC Act and would be beyond the legislative competence of the state legislature. Thus, the provisions of the Madarsa Act which regulate higher education, such as the degrees of Kamil and Fazil (Bachelor’s level and Post-graduate degree) are unconstitutional. However, the Court observed that the regulation of these higher education degrees is separable from the remainder of the Madarsa Act. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that only the provisions which pertain to Fazil and Kamil are unconstitutional and the rest of the Madarsa Act is valid.

Anshuman Aggarwal | Company Secretary | LL.B.